The Reign of Terror 1793–1794: Leading the Angry Mob and Murdering Political Rivals. Part 11: Les Enragés

Ben Hoshko
10 min readMay 15, 2021
Portrait de Maximilien de Robespierre; Anonymous, c. 1790

There are two instances when the people cheer for a politician’s death. The politician was tyrannical or perceived as a tyrant due to the peoples’ self-victimization, or when the politician’s agenda is radicalized and bolsters one group of people while alienating and villainizing another. When power is unchecked, a king becomes an absolute tyrant with ease, but when the entire political system is unchecked, the people lose faith in the system. When the people lose faith in the system, insurrection is sure to follow, and when the people are accustomed to insurrection, murder becomes justice. Following the 10 August Insurrection and the September Massacres, Robespierre justified the angry mob’s action when he spoke in front of the National Convention, and a packed crowd of Parisian citizens in the balcony when he said, “Citizens, did you want a revolution without revolution? …To make a crime of a few apparent or real misdemeanours, inevitable during such a great upheaval, would be to punish them for their devotion” (McPhee 2012, 137). Louis’ execution in January 1793 was supposed to unite the country, it was supposed to end tyranny and bring about a new age of socioeconomic equality, but it only legitimized murder as the truest and most reasonable form of justice. With the French aristocracy gone, the former victims were free to establish a righteous government; however, they egregiously miscalculated that they now became the oppressors, and anyone who questioned the Revolution eventually found the guillotine. The primary goal of the Revolution was to keep the Revolution alive and fend off the Austro-Prussian invasion, but it was the tragic hubris of the Convention to believe that everyone thought as they did. The Convention’s greed blinded them, and instead of securing peace after defeating the Prussians at Valmy, France went on the offensive under the false premise that all Europeans wanted freedom like theirs. To secure the borders and extend the Revolution to other countries, the Convention decreed a requisition for 300,000 soldiers. The people quickly realized that the Convention was merely a role reversal of oppression incapable of solving prior regime issues. The Convention’s action in February and March of 1793 only proved that a bourgeois led country based on reactionary fear was far worse, which led to cries for a return to the ancien régime and a conflict the Convention could not comprehend — civil war.

When one studies the French Revolution, one sees an endless spiderweb of events and occurrences, and by alleviating the confusion, most authors approach and explain these events topically. The events of the Reign of Terror from 1793–1794 are very complex, which include the Revolution, a foreign war, a new republic, the angry mob, counterrevolution/civil war, and eventually an all-out European conflict. To accentuate how fear is the catalyst for the most ruthless carnage, this author will describe the events of 1793–1794 from month to month. Although topical explanation is smoother and unencumbered, fixating on each month allows the reader to truly understand the French peoples’ apprehension and inhumane reactions.

To understand the events in 1793, one must look to the events in the summer and fall of 1792. If the 10 August Insurrection (1792) gave the angry mob political authority when they removed the king from public office, then what could stop them from taking on any politician and general who disagreed with them in the future? If the September Massacres (1792) gave the angry mob the authority to slaughter prisoners and counterrevolutionaries in a kangaroo court setting, then what could stop them from sending anyone to the guillotine? If a rabble army of regular soldiers and volunteer patriots could stop the Prussian invasion at the Battle of Valmy (1792), then what could prevent them from liberating other countries? And if the angry mob and the government was so radical to justify regicide by guillotine (Jan. 1793), then what could prevent them from killing you and your king? The one common thread throughout the entirety of the Revolution is fear, but in 1793 the Convention and many Parisians turned to greed. The Convention’s greed would spark a civil war, but to understand the greed, one must look back to the Battle of Jemappes on November 6, 1792.

Bataille de Jemmapes; Henry Scheffer, after Horace Vernet, 1834

In the 18th century, Europe exhibited an unofficial system of checks and balances to ensure that no country gained too much power; however, if a countries government happens to appear in disarray, the other powers used that opportunity to gain land for themselves — for example, the partitioning of Poland. With Louis dethroned, this was a perfect opportunity for Austria and Prussia to gain territory, yet there were three factors for the French armies’ success in the fall of 1792. The first of these factors was the mass enlistment in April, when France declared war on Austria and Prussia, which was a one-year commitment for all soldiers, as well as the second mass enlistment in July and August. European warfare during this time involved a select amount of professional soldiers, recruited by the nobility, and well trained. Unless a major city was occupied, the civilian population was rarely involved, but during the first year in the War of the First Coalition, France recruited roughly 180,000 volunteers on top of their regular army numbers. The battles of Valmy and Jemappes witnessed wave after wave of French volunteer attacking the Austro-Prussian lines. Although many infantry and cavalry officers fled the country in years prior, many competent sergeants filled the officer ranks and led their troops based on merit. Following the Duke of Brunswick’s retreat from Valmy in late September 1792, General Dumouriez marched his army back to the Austrian Netherlands. This time the French army was on the offensive and attacking a hillside south of the Belgian town, Jemappes.

Les Bataillons parisiens et le 19e régiment de Flandres menés par Dampierre; Raymond Desvarreux-Larpenteur, 1913

The second factor for the French armies’ success was the superior artillery corps. Unlike the cavalry and infantry, most artillery officers did not flee the country in the early Revolution days, and in both Valmy and Jemappes, the artillery demonstrated to be victory’s deciding ingredient. As the Austrians positioned themselves on the hilltop south of Jemappes, the French army massed at the center while heavily pressing the Austrian left and right flanks. The French artillery, positioned on a hilltop southeast of the Austrians, prevented the Austrian cavalry from executing a flanking maneuver and routing the infantry in the center. The French generals nor the Convention never considered the third factor for their success on the battlefield: Catherine the Great of Russia. In the spring of 1792, Russia invaded Poland at the request from the Targowica Confederation. Although a forgone conclusion that Russia would prevail, they did face a significant Polish force under the leadership of American Revolutionary War hero, Tadeusz Kościuszko. Fearing Russian expansion, Prussia was not able to send significant forces to fight the French until an armistice could be established with Russia. On 23 January 1793, two days after Louis XVI’s execution, Prussia and Russia signed a treaty which partitioned Poland for a second time in the 18th century. With the Prussians unoccupied with Russia, and the Austrians unoccupied with the Ottomans, both empires regained lost territory and once again became a significant threat to the French Republic in 1793. The Battle of Jemappes justified France’s arrogance and desire to invade the Dutch Republic.

King Louis’ execution was supposed to bring peace to the nation, it was supposed to bring unity, but that was just one reason for the counterrevolution. Although thrilled that France was now a republic, the radical politicians quickly found out that they were incapable of fixing the country’s primary issues. For so long they criticized, protested, demanded, objected, and griped, but those are the only attributes they could achieve. The radical politician is incapable of establishing a just and quality government because they are at their best when bemoaning and blaming others for their inequities. The radical politician excels at tearing down a government but is completely incompetent when managing a government. With the victories at Valmy and Jemappes, and Louis’ head removed from his body, the Convention became exceedingly greedy and only caused more problems for the French people instead of solving them. The first problem that the new government faced and was incapable of fixing: rapid inflation.

Upon Danton’s return from the Belgian front, he excitedly proclaimed, “The limits of France are marked out by nature. We shall reach them at their four points; at the Ocean, at the Rhine, at the Alps, at the Pyrenees” (Doyle, 200). In a rare occasion of agreement, Brissot even wrote a friend two months earlier saying, “I can tell you that there is one opinion which is spreading here: namely that the French Republic must have the Rhine as its frontier: (Doyle, 200). The greatest issue that the expansion frenzied Convention did not carefully consider was that in order to achieve the Rhine River as the natural border, they would have to invade the Dutch, who were allied with the British. Radical politicians rarely consider the secondary or tertiary consequences of their desires, which consistently maintains a demand for immediate results and blaming the consequences on others when they eventually arrive. The immediate desire following Louis’ execution was for the French to capture not only Belgium, but to invade the Dutch Republic. With a unanimous vote, the Convention declared war on Britain and the Dutch Republic on 1 February 1793. With no consideration to how this would impact the French people, the Convention was now at war with four European powers which spiked inflation.

Common goods were now moved to the troops on the front line, which left most of the country in a high demand for everyday products such as bread, sugar, soap, and wine. In every natural economic circumstance, when there is a high demand, the price naturally rises, and in this circumstance the commodities were scarce due to supplying the troops. Sadly, when the people cheered for the new Republic and Louis’ execution, little did they know that the radical politicians would bring them a far worse economical footing. Coin money was in short supply, many countries stopped trading with France due to the British blockade, paper money was reduced to 51 percent face value, and when the people petitioned the Convention for price controls on bread, the convention denied the request in favor of a natural market economy. With such high demand for resources due to the declarations of war, it was the politicians who caused the severe inflation. At least the prior monarchy sustained the peace with price controls, but since the inauguration of the Revolution, riots have become the norm when the angry mob did not receive their demands, and because of the September Massacres and Louis’ execution, the threshold for violence dropped.

Club des femmes patriotes dans une église; Chérieux, 1793

On 25 February 1793, Paris experienced a new group of radicals. Following the autumn activities in 1792, the sans-culottes considered themselves the Parisian guardians who ensured their version of fairness. When inflation on everyday commodities spiked in February, it became apparent that the Convention shared no concern for their wellbeing, and when the system fails the people, the people riot. The Revolution has made it clear that when you back a French woman into an impossible situation that threatens her means and purpose in life, she inherently becomes the most vicious and dangerous element on the streets: Les Enragés. Translated as the madmen, the rabids, or the furious, these Enragés took to the streets on 25 February and began smashing shop windows and holding bakeries and grocery stores hostage. Oddly, the Enragés did not merely ransack and kill the shop owners but changed the price of bread and commodities to what they believed to be fair and then paid the shop; however, woah unto the shop owner who was accused and found hoarding goods, for he was quickly executed by the Enragés. These actions are not uncommon when poverty-stricken people are given the opportunity. Throughout history, although perceived as cultural change, riots expose humanities selfish destruction, which Charles Dickens (2003, 162) explains in A Tale of Two Cities, “The people tore to pieces and scattered far and wide with great enjoyment, while the tradesmen hurriedly shut up their shops; for a crowd in those times stopped at nothing, and was a monster much dreaded.” Fear from invasion occupied many in France, but fear from starvation roused the urban Parisian women to take matters into their own hands. February 1793 only proved that the Convention was not ready to lead a country and would continually dig a deeper hole to maintain control. Every month from this moment only proved that the radical politicians were only capable of reaction and not prevention. February’s reaction would spark March’s civil war, and March’s civil war would create the Committee of Public Safety. Dominated by radical left-wing politicians, the Committee of Public Safety would not only villainize groups of people but would become the greatest of villains themselves.

References

Dickens, Charles. 2003. A Tale of Two Cities. Edited by Richard Maxwell. London: Penguin Books.

Doyle, William. 2002. The Oxford History of the French Revolution. 2nd ed. New York: University of Oxford Press.

McPhee, Peter, ed. 2012. Robespierre: A Revolutionary Life. Yale University Press.

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